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‘Inauthentic’ Sukumbasi: The Politics of Aesthetics and
Urgency in Kathmandu

Sabin Ninglekhu

This article discusses how claims of the urban
poor for the right to the city come up against
governmental programs seeking to secure
norms of private property, environmental
sustainability, and elite aesthetics. Here, the
city in question is Kathmandu, Nepal, and the
urban poor are referred to as sukumbasi,
squatters. Baviskar (2011) defines ‘elite politics’
as a mode of expressing anxieties of the self
in relation to one’s physical surroundings. I
interpret a liberal environmentalist project—
the Bagmati Action Plan—in terms of such an
elite politics, and explore the ways in which
this river restoration program was taken up
by the Nepali state. I show how bourgeois
liberal environmentalism, when it encounters
‘the slum,’ produces spatial imaginaries, such
as ‘pure rivers’ and ‘green riverbanks,’ and
representations of sukumbasi as ‘inauthentic’
residents. This logic often furnishes the
rationale for violently expelling sukumbasi
from the slum and the city.
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Adopting the state’s governmental frames
to distinguish between ‘authentic’ and
‘inauthentic’ sukumbasi, the Bagmati Action
Plan’s leadership produced class cleavage
among the landless—between squatters, who
were alleged to be ‘landed’ and those given
a ‘landless’ designation. As such, this article
asks two questions: How does the threat of
violence forge sukumbasi political subjectivity
and inform renewed strategies of inhabitance?
And, what implications these strategies have
for understanding the challenges facing the
politics of the poor? These inquiries locate
the practices of the poor within the context
of a ‘politics of urgency’— an ad hoc creative
and counterintuitive ‘non-movement’ forged
in the crucible of crisis, in which the organized
practice of everyday life is disrupted and
stretched in new and uncertain directions.
Keywords: Kathmandu, sukumbasi, solidarity, politics,
inauthenticity, aesthetics.

Introduction
September 3, 2010, signaled a watershed moment in
the restoration of the Bagmati River. The river has its
origin in Shiv Puri, the northeast end of the city. Along
with its tributaries, the Bagmati cuts through the city of
Kathmandu and exits the Kathmandu Valley from the
south. Discussions for the Bagmati Action Plan (BAP), as
the river restoration effort is called, had begun in 2007
after a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed
between the United Nation’s Environment Program
(UNEP) and the National Trust for Nature Conservation
(NTNC). A complete version of the plan was developed in
December 2009. Madhav Kumar Nepal, prime minister at
the time and a prominent leader of Nepal’s United Marxist
Leninist (UML) Party, marked the occasion with a jubilant
remark: “Just like everyone here, I dream of being able to
jog along the Bagmati banks early [in the] morning and
breathe fresh air. I urge all to support the government bid
of restoring the Bagmati to its original pristine condition”
(The Himalayan Times 2005).1 He followed the call by
declaring the BAP a project of national priority.2
The following year, in 2010, an implementation committee
for the BAP was formed, called the Bagmati Civilization
Integrated Development Committee (BCIDC). As a fiveyear project, BAP’s goal is to clean up the Bagmati River by
installing wastewater treatment plants on the riverbanks
and restoring the river’s aesthetic and cultural values (BAP
Draft Report 2008). Under the plan, it is mandatory that 20
meters on either side of the river be cleared of any kind of
activity—commercial or residential. Eviction of fourteen
settlements on the banks of the Bagmati and its tributaries was therefore deemed mandatory for implementing
the BAP.
This article and the research it represents is part of a
larger body of work that examines the interface at which
state-led projects of development in the city encounter the
livelihood of city inhabitants. One question guiding this
work is: How do state-led projects, as they encounter the
‘slum,’ produce spatial imaginaries and portray subjects?
For example, the state mobilizes phrases such as ‘pure
river’ and ‘green parks’ as part of a discursive exercise to
promote the BAP. Concurrently, the state also portrays
sukumbasi, the urban landless who inhabit the riverbanks,
as ‘inauthentic’ residents who are obstacles to realizing
the goals of the BAP.3 Together these discourses provide a
rationale expelling sukumbasi from the settlements and the
city and add a sense of urgency to this endeavor. This leads
to another, interrelated question: How does the threat of
violence and eviction forge sukumbasi political subjectivity and inform renewed strategies of inhabitation as well

as resistance to the BAP? This second question, in turn,
prompts an examination of the limits and potential of the
politics of the poor.
The first section of the paper focuses on the discursive
ways in which the state portrays the BAP to the public in
the city. The erasure of sukumbasi settlements on the riverbank is a necessary precondition for implanting the action
plan. This, in turn, necessitates that the state furnish a
‘rationale’ for the plan to justify the potential violence
contained within the plan. As such, this section shows
how the state takes recourse to a double-sided politics of
aesthetics. This brand of politics at once expresses nostalgia for the city rooted in ‘civilization,’ and articulates
a desire beholden to the spirits of a homemade version of
the ‘world class city.’4 This politics of aesthetics is not only
in the service of the production of space. Co-constituted
with the production of space is also, as mentioned earlier,
a portrayal of the sukumbasi as ‘inauthentic.’
The article then turns toward the politics of subjectivity,
which may be understood as “…the lived multiplicity of
positioning” (Blackman et al. 2008: 6). How can the politics
of subjectivity provide a way to analyze the multiple ways
in which the poor reframe their subject position in relation
to the state-led politics of aesthetics? In response to the
BAP and its attendant politics of aesthetics, sukumbasi find
tactical ways to acquiesce to the allegations of ‘inauthenticity’. In so doing, they tend to aestheticize their own
politics, thereby producing a cleavage within sukumbasi
communities. As such, if lived experience is central to the
formation of sukumbasi solidarity, then the recourse to
aesthetics renders the solidarity ad hoc, and in the process,
reveals fractures within the sukumbasi class group.
The final section of this article examines the ‘right to
the city’—a politics that is forged by the urban poor, in
response to being culturally marginalized and materially
oppressed, to make claims for formal as well as substantive
rights (Marcuse 2012). Here, I discuss the implications of
the co-constituted politics of aesthetics and inauthenticity
for examining the limits of the politics of the poor.
Bagmati Action Plan: A Case of Bourgeois
Environmentalism
Kathmandu’s transformation in the last two decades may
be characterized by several factors: the “gentrification of
state-spaces” (Ghertner 2011) that favor the propertied
residents for accessing municipal services; the vision of
‘urban gigantism’ underwriting direct investments which
fund the construction of high-rise buildings and gated
communities; and the conformity of such transformations
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to elusive logics such as ‘aesthetics,’ ‘civilization,’ and ‘modernity.’ However, in imagining Kathmandu as an unfolding processual politics of a potentially bourgeois desire,
one ought not lose sight of a relational co-constitution
of the production of ‘slum’ as an attendant politics of the
transformation.
These urban transformations may be seen as a mode
of expression of the anxieties and desires of the self in
relation to one’s physical surroundings; the ‘self,’ for the
purposes of this article, may be understood as the state or
the civil society in its myriad incarnations: NGOs, neighborhood associations, community-based organizations and
many similar assemblages. Some of such politics contain
exclusive tendencies that urban sociologist Amita Baviskar
(2003) chooses to call “bourgeois environmentalism”: an
organized force that links upper class concerns around
aesthetics, public health, safety, leisure and civic order
with environmental concerns. According to Baviskar,
these concerns combine to see, and portray, the urban
poor as “the specter of dirt, disease, and crime, a monster
threatening the body civic” (2003: 92). The politics that is
assembled around putting bourgeois environmentalism
to motion, Baviskar argues, also challenges us to critically investigate the configuration of a public sphere that
promotes the voice of the upper class as legitimate, while
excluding, in the process, the concerns of the urban poor
and their most basic service needs. A similar mode of class
politics is evident in Kathmandu when one traces the
discursive and political terrain from which the BAP gleans
a ‘moral’ content. I interpret the bourgeois project of environmentalism, which got taken up by the state in the form
of the BAP, in terms of such class politics. More specifically, I focus on the alignment of middle-class aspirations
with the ideals of the state insofar as it relates to the BAP,
and the modalities of the exclusion of the urban poor that
such an alignment would engender.
BAP is not exclusively driven by market demands or
private alliances. It does not come across as a branding
mechanism dictated by the logic of the ‘World City.’ While
the BAP is partially funded by the Japan Water Agency
(JWA), the funding is still not part of the circuit of capital
and ideas that are dictated by global financial capitalism. In a report that describes the plan in detail, specific
reference is made to a rehabilitation of Nanjing-Qinhuai
River in China as an example from which to draw inspiration. Citing the apparent success of the rehabilitation
project that faced similar problems that the Bagmati River
faces—“illegal squatters,” a “filthy environment,” and a
“contaminated smelly river” as described in the report—
now “Nanjing-Qinhuai River has become a historical scenic
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zone, a cultural scenic zone and tourism scenic zone characterizing the ancient civilization of Nanjing” (BAP 2009:
5). The reference to ‘civilization’ as one of the logics for
rehabilitation of the Bagmati River comes up frequently
during interviews with the planners involved in the BAP.
But no other symbolic or material links can be traced to
the Nanjing-Qinhuai project. BAP does echo what Ghertner
(2015) calls a ‘World-Class City Aesthetic’—an idealized
vision of a modern, ‘green’ city that is devoid of slum-like
dirt. As such, for a city-making project, such as the BAP,
that confirms to such aesthetic standards, creating a field
of perception is a necessary step in the production of city
spaces that are considered desirable. However, unlike the
World Class City projects, the field of perception is yoked
less to “fantastic futurism” (Ghertner 2015), and more to
the time in which the river and its banks were the habitus
and harbinger of ‘civilization.’
The Bagmati water has always been a potent carrier of
purity. Traditional waterspouts, rest homes, and temples
are found on the banks of the Bagmati. Ghat, platforms on
which Hindu mortuary rituals are performed, line the river. Pointing to these structures and rituals, Mahesh Basnet,
the ex-chairman of the BAP, claims, “The civilization of
the city hinged on the river and its purity. Therefore, it is
important to protect the river” (Interview, 12 September,
2012). In the nostalgic pursuit of what may be called the
‘authentic’ city, photographs and maps of the river and the
riparian landscapes depicting the pristine-looking river
are highlighted during meetings, seminars, and interviews
to advance a certain politics of aesthetics necessary to
reclaim the authentic city—the city that was. However, the
realization of this politics of aesthetics, which is intended
to make the BAP legible and legitimate, hinges on the eviction of the poor from the spaces they inhabit. One necessary tactic the state deployed, as a result, was to mobilize
the discourse of ‘inauthenticity.’
Fourteen squatter settlements on the banks of the Bagmati and its tributaries are under threat of eviction due to
the BAP. These settlements all fall under the plan’s urban
zone, for which there are four different goals outlined:
improve the river quality; improve the riparian landscape;
manage the squatter settlements along the riverbanks; and
conserve and regenerate tangible and intangible cultural
heritage (BAP 2008). Together, these goals link concerns
for the environment with concerns about heritage, and of
course, the livelihood on the riverbanks. The benevolent
intention inherent in these goals is met with questions by
the sukumbasi, some NGOs, and the public because of the
propensity for violence implicit in one of these goals also
contain—namely, the state’s attempt to manage the squat-

Figure 1. A sukumbasi
settlement on the banks of
the Bagmati River.
(Ninglekhu, 2013)

ter settlements. In the past, such ‘management’ has either
resulted in outright eviction with no resettlement plan or
attempts at relocation that have failed one after another.
It was therefore important for BCIDC to add legitimacy as
well as urgency to the plan to make it a project that was
mandatory not just on environmental grounds but also
necessary on ethical grounds. As such, the recourse to discourses of the different variants of ‘the environment’ and
the ‘inauthentic sukumbasi’ was a necessary tool for BCIDC
to provide a rationale for the legitimacy of eviction with
or without resettlement. Such discourses would normally
animate public events that BCIDC organized to promote
the BAP.
One such event was primarily targeted at journalists.
A handful of prominent political leaders representing
Nepal’s major parties were invited to the event as speakers. After an opening presentation by one of committee
members outlining BAP’s implementation methods and
its intended targets, the politicians took turns speaking.
The common theme in their speeches was nostalgia for the
river that no longer was what it used to be. Every now and
then, the ‘inauthentic’ sukumbasi would be held responsible for the river’s degradation, rendering their expulsion
from the riverbanks necessary. As her opening remarks
at one of the meetings, a top leader of the United Marxist
Leninist Party (UML) revisited her experience of the Bagmati from almost a decade ago. She was at the Bagmati River to pay tribute to her dead husband, who had also been
a prominent UML leader. As part of the ritual, she remembered dipping her hands into the river to pocket a cupful

of water. She let the water rest in her palms momentarily,
and then let it slip through her fingers as she said prayers
for the departed. Returning home that day, she could smell
something but wasn’t sure where the smell was coming
from—herself or her surroundings. This smell lasted for
a few days. It was only later that she realized she had
been walking around with a pair of hands that carried the
stench of the Bagmati water. She later lamented the river’s
loss of ‘purity.’ Another speaker later endorsed BAP with a
nod to those hands: “As long as the river is not clean, just
like the fellow speaker’s hands, the civilization of this city,
too, shall always stink.” The anecdote presents water as a
potent carrier of purity. The metaphors serve the purpose
of combining threats to religious practices with threats to
the body and the city—‘civilization’ being the overriding
theme. As such, sukumbasi had to be something more than
just an ‘obstacle’ settled on the riverbank that was not so
much ‘land’ as the river’s right-of-way. They also had to be
portrayed as polluters of purity.
Anne Rademacher (2009) notes that in the immediate
aftermath of the state of emergency in late 2001, during
the time when the People’s War was at its peak, sukumbasi
were portrayed as a “security concern.” The sukumbasi settlements on the riverbanks, the state feared, were “a relatively uncontrolled space where rural dissent and rebellion
might assemble and take refuge in the city” (Rademacher
2009: 520). State-led environmental interventions, therefore, had to be understood in the broader context of the
People’s War as well as the prevailing understanding of
sukumbasi as ‘dirt’ and an ‘eye sore.’ Relocating a sukumbasi
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settlement to the outskirts of the city was therefore, also,
finding a place for sukumbasi culturally, environmentally,
as well as politically—to secure the city from a potential
upsurge of class-based violence.
Official documents indicate that what sukumbasi claimed
as land was not ‘land’ per se, but rather the Bagmati’s
riverbed. It was so because channelization of flow from
harvesting of sand and municipal out-takes up-stream had
reduced the water level, and prevented the Bagmati River
and its tributaries from flowing at their previous levels for
many years. Dams built in response as restoration schemes
for re-submerging exposed sand flats would trap sediment
during the annual monsoon and thereby raise riverbed
levels. The raised riverbed, according to the planning
documents, would be claimed by sukumbasi for encroachment. “Sukumbasi were thereby considered obstacles to
restoring that flow, having claimed river territory as land
in a way that was inconsistent with perceived ecological
order. Their land claims were rendered illegitimate in
urban environmental terms as they were in legal terms,”
claims Rademacher (2009: 519). However, maintaining
water flow is crucial to the environment as much as it is to
‘culture’ —which the BAP committee frames through the
discourse of ‘civilization,’ as alluded to by a former Deputy
Project Manager of BCIDC, Anil Bhadra Khanal. Khanal
says, “[Restoration] is not just about the river. It is also
about religious and cultural heritages that lie on the riverbanks. These are structures that ensure sustenance of our
cultural and religious practices, which are tied to civilization. Our festivals and mortuary rituals that we perform on
the river needs water flow. To ensure that the festivals and
rituals continue to exist, we need to make sure that the
river continues to flow” (Interview, 23 October, 2012).
These claims of environmental health in relation to
cultural practices added legitimacy with recourse to a
nostalgia that was meant to evoke memories of a civilized
Kathmandu and, subsequently, a desire to restore civilization by rebuilding heritage along the riverbanks. When I
questioned Mahesh Basnet, the ex-chairman, about what
‘civilization’ indicated, he said: “[the] Bagmati carries not
just the river’s civilization, but civilization of the entire
city. Therefore, to revive the city’s civilization, it is important that we bring back our traditional structures like
water-spouts, temples, and so on.” Restoring structures on
the riverbanks to revive civilization has functional as well
as aesthetic value, as Basnet implies. But when deployed
as a tool with a political function, ‘civilization’ becomes
a potent weapon to delegitimize the poor. The particular strategy of enmeshing culture and morality with the
environment in attempts at river restoration has a long
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tradition that has relied on ‘othering’ migrants as people
without the ability of understanding the river’s culture.
What is peculiar about Kathmandu’s case, however, is that
it is the state seizing the middle-class discourse about
‘civilization’ and ‘inauthenticity’ to endorse the project of
environmentalism. The prevailing consciousness considers
clean river water and green river banks more important
than livelihood and shelter for the working poor who inhabit the riverbank. These raise a pertinent question: How
does ‘the environment’ serve as an optic through which
poverty and the poor are reframed en route to building the
good city?
The ‘Authentic’ City
Hutta Ram Baidya is a Kathmandu native who comes from
a middle-class family. An engineer by profession, he has
earned the moniker ‘Bagmati Baa’ or ‘the Bagmati Man’—a
tribute to his lifelong dedication to, in his words, “saving the Bagmati.” A native of Kathmandu, after working
independently for several decades to clean up the Bagmati
River, he has now retired from the activism that gave him
the moniker. For all the recognition that is granted to him
as an environmental activist, the river has little to show
for Hutta Ram Ji’s lifelong dedication. The section of the
river that flows through the heart of the city looks like an
open sewer.
When I went to see Hutta Ram Ji in his residence, my hope
of hearing him speak about his Bagmati restoration efforts
were momentarily dashed. His opening was rather dismissive, “So you want to know about the Bagmati? What do
you want to do with it? There is nothing to know.” It was
as if it was he who wanted to know nothing more about
the Bagmati. He then lifted himself up and walked away
from the patio overlooking the busy street. The pungent
smell coming from the nearby Tukuche—a tributary of the
Bagmati—did little to comfort me as I waited for his next
move. A few seconds later, from inside his room, Hutta
Ram Ji raised his voice, instructing me to come inside his
bedroom. I obliged. He gestured with his right hand that I
sit on the chair next to him, while his left hand played with
the mouse, frantically moving the cursor up and down on
his desktop screen. He then turned to me, feigned a wry
smile and asked, in a hopeful tone, if I would be able to
read an email from his son in the United States. He said his
eyes hurt.
After I hesitantly read the email, he pointed to a corner
of the room. There were three old suitcases, one on top of
the other. He then asked me to fetch him the one in the
middle, place it on the bed next to the computer, and open

it. In it was a pile of documents—newspaper cutouts, old
photos, certificates—all of them related to the
Bagmati River. Most of them black and white, the newspaper cutouts and photos depicted the pristine-looking
Bagmati of history. He picked one from the pile, a picture
that he took of the UN Park, built in the 1990s on a section
of the riverbank in Thapathali by the Ministry of Environment and Population. It was to commemorate the 50thyear anniversary of the UN’s presence in Nepal. At the end
of the park bordering the river, there is an embankment
made of concrete walls.
The river cannot speak. Therefore, Hutta Ram Ji speaks on
its behalf, in the process abstracting the nature, the river,
from its social entanglement. The river has its own culture
that is eroding after it came in contact with ‘development.’ Hutta Ram ji bemoans, “Why regulate the flow of
the river? Are we supposed to clean up the riverbank by
building parks and dams, or do we first try to understand
what Bagmati’s heart desires and follow accordingly. Who
are we to control nature? How can we say we are protecting her when we are regulating her?” He insinuates that
the UN Park is a case of “development” disrupting the
river’s natural state. “It is impossible to clean the Bagmati
just by spending millions. There is no need to murder the
river’s culture in the name of development. Development
is not good when there is no consideration for nature
and culture.”
Across the river, at the opposite end of UN Park, there
is a sukumbasi settlement called Paurakhi Basti. It is not
very far from Hutta Ram Ji’s house. Therefore, when Hutta
Ram Ji confides in me his concerns by pointing to one
of the bedroom walls, it may be fair to assume that he
could be talking about Paurakhi Basti that is to be blamed,
just like the state is to be blamed, for ruining the river.
“They [the sukumbasi] are the culprits that disrespected
Bagmati’s culture. They encroach because the government
is too weak to do anything about it. Because they find the
government weak, they then started making demands.” He
continues, “Why demand land? Why not other necessities
of life? What about employment?” After pausing briefly, he
bemoans, “The Bagmati was not always this bad.”
Hutta Ram Ji continues, “Those who came to the city early
on were hard working people. Even if they lived on the
riverbanks, they worked hard to make a living, and would
later move elsewhere. It was those who followed the early
migrants that would never leave. They have remained on
the riverbank ever since…These people [the sukumbasi] do
not know about the river’s culture because they are not
from Kathmandu. They do not care.” The objectification of

nature, the river, as something with a culture of its own,
is lent further credibility via subjection of sukumbasi as
people ignorant of the river’s culture.
Hutta Ram Ji passed away in December 2013. He left behind
rich imprints on the on-going restoration efforts led by social groups as well as the state. He is credited with coining
the term ‘Bagmati Civilization,’ which articulates a desire
to restore the city’s civilization through restoration of
the Bagmati River. BCIDC borrows its naming from Hutta
Ram Ji’s phrase. ‘Civilization’ continues to be an enduring
environmental theme in citizen-led environmental activism for river restoration. ‘Civilization,’ in such a sense, is
indeed about restoring old temples and traditional taps, as
is officially invoked. In addition to rebuilding the heritage,
‘civilization’ is also protective of the ‘culture’ (of the river),
which is only possible once the polluter of the culture is
identified, and subsequently removed. As a result, subsequent efforts towards preserving the Bagmati have done
so by separating the polluters from the protectors. Unlike
Hutta Ram Ji, who blamed both the state and the society
for ruining the river, these latter efforts, such as the BAP,
or the Friends of Bagmati, have firmly put the blame on
one section of the society: the sukumbasi.
“It was Hutta Ram Baidya who made the government
realize that preserving the Bagmati was not just about
restoring the health of the river water but also about
restoring civilization,” says Megh Ale, president of Friends
of Bagmati, an NGO committed to the goal of restoring
the Bagmati’s environment. While it is not clear from
their website what ‘environment’ suggests, restoring it
implies addressing more than just the water quality. The
organization laments the loss of ‘purity’ and ‘integrity’ of
the ‘scared’ river. As stated in organizational documents,
it is committed to saving the Bagmati’s “cultural, natural
and heritage significance from pollution and other
threats.” One of the flagship events of Friends of Bagmati
is the Bagmati River Festival, an annual event. Over the
course of the day, the event turns into a spectacle for
the public. Public officials, political party leaders, NGO
representatives, and media personnel are all invited to the
event as ‘stakeholders.’ “We live here on the riverbank, yet
somehow we are not the stakeholders of the river,” says a
resident of a settlement in Sankhamul.
Ghertner (2010) contends that in the absence of maps,
statistics, and documents, the raw materials that legitimizes rule, and on which rule is founded, aesthetics serves as
a governing logic for doing development. The politics of
aesthetics is one of the central logics of the BAP. Aesthetics, as a politics of desire, also becomes a discursive site
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around which state and middle and upper-middle class
interests coalesce as a force of bourgeois environmentalism that puts under threat structures and people that are
deemed to potentially disrupt the making of the order of
aesthetics. The environmental and ecological practices led
by the elite in collaboration with different state bodies,
actively and passively, therefore seek to draw the lines
between migrants and the natives of Kathmandu; between
those who belong to the city and the river versus those
who do not not; between those who know the ‘culture’ of
the river and those who do not. Throughout the politics of
aesthetics, what is apparent is not the pitting of ‘nature’
against ‘civilization.’ Instead, the coalescing of nature with
civilization is made visible, creating a ‘natural civilization’
to be reclaimed through the BAP—the reclaiming of the
authentic city. What is it about the urban environment
that selectively allows only elite and middle-class citizens
to make claims about matters of public interest? Why are
the public, and their other variants such as Friends of
Bagmati so exclusively defined that it would leave out the
urban poor?
The ‘Inauthentic’ Sukumbasi
There is a tendency to use “poverty of place”
interchangeably with “poverty of people” (Gilbert
2009). The dwellers (people) have to represent the
dwelling (place)—normally a decrepit shack—in their
appearance for them to be counted as real, or authentic.
In other words, one has to look like a sukumbasi to be one.
Therefore, a common expression that pervades middleclass conversations about sukumbasi in the city is: “How
can they be sukumbasi when they are so well-dressed
and ride motorbikes?” In other words, they have to look
like “matter out of place,” to use Mary Douglas’ (1966)
metaphor of ‘dirt’ as a conceptual frame. In the case
of sukumbasi, the optics of ‘slum’ is used as a figurative
reference to gauge of the ‘purity’ (as an ‘authentic’ figure)
of the sukumbasi identity as it is claimed. It is a commonly
held belief among members of the BAP committee that
a majority of the sukumbasi populations in the city are
‘inauthentic’ because “they own land—if not in the city
then elsewhere” (Mahesh Bahadur Basnet, Interview,
12 February, 2012). Basnet further claimed, “I live next
to the Buddha Nagar settlement.5 I have lived there for
many years now and know many sukumbasi people there
very well. I can say for sure that many I know have land
either in Kathmandu or elsewhere. I don’t really know
of any Nepali that are landless.”6 The subtext here is that
sukumbasi are ‘inauthentic’ squatters because they are
landowners in some place in Nepal if not in Kathmandu.
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In relation to comparative cases elsewhere, for example
in Indian cities, critical urban scholars have argued how
courts and media are the domains in which elite politics
coalesce, crystallize and become more concrete (Baviskar
2011). This germination of politics has led some to suggest
that analysis of contemporary urban politics “account
for the court not only as an arbiter of justice but also as a
parallel administrative and executive body” (Bhan 2009:
134). Starting September 2011, Nepal’s Home Ministry and
subsequently the Department of Urban Development and
Building Construction (DUDBC) started issuing eviction
notice to the riverbank settlements via different news dailies on a regular basis. In response, sukumbasi filed a case
in the appellate court challenging the validity of the order
by referring to an earlier case that had played out in 2001.
That year, under Kathmandu’s then mayor, Keshav Sthapit,
the municipality had signed an agreement with Society for
Preservation of Shelter and Habitat, or Basobas, meaning
habitat in conversational terms, that in principle provided amnesty to sukumbasi from eviction. The agreement,
signed between Basobas and the mayor of the Kathmandu
Municipality, was eventually rendered as having no legal
mandate to protect sukumbasi from eviction. Consequently, the appellate court issued a 35-day stay-order to the
plaintiff, the sukumbasi. Later, the Supreme Court of Nepal
issued a ruling in favor of the government’s notice of eviction. The involvement of the court in such processes has
continued to take place in the promotion and implementation of BAP.
The Politics of Subjectivity: Acquiescing to the Accusation
of ‘Inauthenticity’
Critical development and postcolonial studies scholars who
give voice to the struggles of the urban poor do so from the
standpoint of a “politics of patience”—to use Arjun Appadurai’s framing (Appadurai 2002: 30). This kind of politics
is gleaned from ‘ordinary’ everyday practices that involve,
for example, relations of patronage with lower-level state
officials that are patiently built over a long period of time.
These relationships enabe access to basic services that are
crucial in transforming vacant public lands into properly
functioning and livable neighborhoods imbued with a sense
of place and a sense of community. In these accounts of the
politics of the poor, through their contribution to the production of space and the emotion and labor invested in it,
the poor are able to form and make claims for the right to
the city. However, when the politics of patience encounters
a state-led development project that destabilizes the routine of the everyday life, the existing relations of patronage
no longer work because it is normally the national-scale

government bodies, not the lower-level individual officials,
that are the source of eviction threats. The poor are thus
left with devising a new kind of politics that may be termed
‘politics of urgency.’
Critical urban scholarship that has documented the interface at which state-led development programs encounter
the livelihood of the poor do so from the standpoint of governmentalization of the state. Such an approach focuses on
the techniques of governmentality that the state adopts by
mobilizing certain discursive practices that render the poor
expendable, their settlements, and practices therein. However, an inquiry into the ‘politics of urgency’ during the
time of crisis can show that the poor are not merely passive
recipients of developmentalist intervention from the top
patiently devising “governmentality from below” (Appadurai 2002: 35). A politics of urgency can reveal the tactical
ways in which the urban poor renegotiate their claims for
the right to the city by turning on their heads the discursive tools that the state mobilizes to subjectivize the poor.
In the case of Kathmandu, sukumbasi couch their renewed
demands with the state not on the same terms that were set
in the ‘normal’ time dedicated to the politics of patience, in
which space, and inhabitance, are central; rather, realizing
the importance of time as a commodity in short supply
during urgent moments, sukumbasi acquiesce to the state’s
allegations to make renewed claims to ensure that their
right to live in the city, to be in the city, is ensured. Aware
of the limits of the politics of patience, sukumbasi employ
tactical ways to renew their demands by making surprising
attempts to act jointly with the state, not against the state,
in distinguishing the authentic from the inauthentic sukumbasi. The state, therefore, is not merely adversarial but also
instrumental to the goals of realizing the sukumbasi demand
to maintain a place in the city, in the sense that it permeated a new mode of subjectivity geared toward differentiation
rather than solidarity amongst sukumbasi.
Aestheticization of Politics
Ananya Roy (2009: 160) describes “civic governmentality”
as neither top-down nor bottom-up, but rather as a “dialectical movement between insurgency and institutionalization.” Borrowing from Roy’s framework, I see the acquiescence to the accusation of ‘inauthenticity’ as a technique of
civic governmentality that rely on what may be called an
aestheticization of politics from below. Such politics is dialectical in nature, in that they engage the same terms —aesthetics and inauthenticity—produced from above in forging
their politics. However, the modality through which such
politics is forged is engineered from below.

In 2001, Basobas conducted their first self-enumeration
survey; the same year they had reached the agreement
with the mayor that I describe towards the end in the previous section.7 Enumerators from Basobas visited sukumbasi
settlements to survey household conditions, household
size, and the demographic composition of families in the
settlements. All family members had their photos taken
in front of their house after each house was assigned a
number. Family IDs issued thenceforth would contain the
person’s name, age, sex, household number, and length
of stay in the settlement. New settlers or migrants after 2001 would no longer be issued such ID. Apart from
being ‘formally’ identified as sukumbasi, the ID would also
provide a basis for accessing basic services from the local
government—in lieu of the citizenship card or landownership certificate. That was the agreement reached with the
municipality.
When I asked Hukum Bahadur Lama, ex-president and one
of the founders of Basobas, why they no longer distributed
family IDs, he seemed to evade the question and suggested that the call was made to enable them to manage the
sukumbasi movement more effectively. A larger number of
sukumbasi, he explained, would mean a larger number of
issues that must be dealt with. Whatever the rationale was
to stop issuing the family IDs, the upshot of the decision,
over time, was that it became harder for new sukumbasi to claim formal citizenship rights, landownership, or
inhabitance. Basanta Jaisi alludes to the distinction that
evolved among sukumbasi—between ID holders and those
who didn’t hold IDs—regarding who could claim authenticity: “There are sukumbasi, hukumbasi and dalal8 in those
settlements. We have never said that we are all authentic.
But the government has rolled us all into one.” Jaisi signals
a concession that there are in fact inauthentic sukumbasi:
those without the ID. This concession, in turn, opens up
political possibilities for sukumbasi collaborating with the
government. Leaders like Jaisi are prepared to embrace
the state-produced discourse of ‘inauthenticity’ in the
hope of forging a working collaboration with the state.
This willingness was soon put to action in the middle of an
anti-eviction campaign in 2012.
In early January 2012, Basobas members seemed to radiate
excitement at the prospect of incorporating a scientific
technology that was believed to add credibility to the
demands upon the state. Their counterparts from India,
staff members of Slum Dwellers International (SDI), had
brought a biometric survey tool—a self-identification
technology that was deemed to be successful in India.9 SDI
members, along with Basobas staff gathered in a settle-
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ment on the southwest end of the city, where the survey
tool would be tested. As they approached the settlement
carrying a laptop, attached to which was a device that was
part of the survey tool, they were met with a few curious
onlookers who seemed to have little clue about what to
expect from these people with gadgets. After taking a picture and collecting fingerprints from individual household
members, the biometric survey software would digitally
overlay the householder’s headshot, fingerprints, and the
number on the front door of the person’s house into a digital database. The number, as discussed earlier, would have
been issued during the self-survey conducted by Basobas
in 2001.
In theory, such a system would permanently digitize
and archive the Family ID obtained in 2001, and prevent
sukumbasi householders from swapping, selling, or renting
out their ‘property’. Including the archived data into the
government data system, a goal of the self-identification
project, would also help the government crosscheck if any
sukumbasi household legally owned land anywhere else
in the country. Basanta Jaisi, another member of Basobas,
explains:
The biometric survey helps to identify sukumbasi
along with their settlement and house number.
Having that scientific information will make it
easier for the government to locate sukumbasi in
the city. Right now the survey is at an experimental
phase. People from India are doing it. But some of
us will learn how to use it soon. We want to show
the results of the experiment to Mahesh Bahadur
Basnet.10
This scientific method lends credibility to that political
move through the employment of scientific logic and
bureaucratic rationality, which in turn would help create
a social field of possibility, indicating the will of sukumbasi
to collaborate with the state in separating the ‘authentic’
from the ‘inauthentic.’
More recently, Basobas collaborated with Social Science
Baha to create digital maps of the settlements in the city. A
research team comprising members of Social Science Baha
and Basobas finished conducting the survey in 2014. Social
Science Baha trained the researchers and provided them
necessary research tools such as GPS machines. “When we
Google Kathmandu, our settlements are not mapped. We
are invisible. The long-term goal of this survey is to make
ourselves visible through Google,” says Smita, one of the
Basobas leaders. The mapping project, however, also has
a tendency to re-inscribe the cleavage among sukumbasi.
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Smita further claims, “Once we have the map, it is easier
for us to manage the settlements. In that, we can prevent
new addition of households to the existing settlements,
which is important for staying away from the ‘inauthenticity’ blame.”
This project of visibility reveals not only the means of
reproduction of authenticity/inauthenticity discourse,
but also the privileging of ‘time’ as a maker and logic
of authenticity. The prevention of ‘new additions’ indicates that there are and there will be sukumbasi who
will not be eligible for making claims as the ‘authentic’
sukumbasi through the logic framed by Basobas. In Kathmandu, these groups are among the sukumbasi who have
a relatively more recent history of settlement in the city,
and as a result, do not share as strong links with the local
and municipal states as the older ones—those without
enough political and symbolic capital to weather the storm
of eviction. Equally importantly, one may argue, digital
maps and biometric procedures conducted through the
deployment of technologies such as laptops, cameras, and
GPS systems, are a project of visibility that has a tendency
to aestheticize the politics of the poor in the process. This
kind of aestheticization of politics led by the sukumbasi is
necessary to keep open the field of possibility for collaborating with the state.
The use of the different devices to strategically inhabit
the state’s claims of ‘inauthenticity’ enable sukumbasi to
enact a ‘scientific’ subjectivity with the hope that such a
move would help create governable space for sukumbasi
to co-inhabit with the state. In other words, through the
adoption of the biometric survey tool and Google maps,
some section of the sukumbasi were willing to accept the
fictitious authentic/inauthentic dichotomy in order to
be able to work collaboratively with the government to
find out ‘inauthentic’ sukumbasi. As Chatterjee (2004: 57)
might argue, this was the sukumbasi way of “investing
their collective identity with a moral content of a community,” whereby, a certain politics of aesthetics begins
to take shape in the form of digital IDs, digital maps and
aerial photographs. The adoption of biometric survey tools
and the self-enumeration survey results indicate that the
urban poor are not just passive recipients of instruments
of governmentality imposed on them from above. Rather,
these tools are actively utilized on ‘scientific’ grounds, to
engage the state’s demands but through the devices that
the sukumbasi deploy.

Conclusion
I have, so far, discussed two key ideas, aesthetics and
inauthenticity, which coalesce to frame the environment
along with the poor. To recall, certain imagery of aesthetics was conjured to cater to the middle-class sensibilities.
The content of the politics of aesthetics was not so much
derived from ‘fantasy futurism,’ as many ‘world class’
aspirant cities might desire. Rather, riparian aesthetics is
to be reclaimed via revival of ‘civilization’ and restoration
of the river’s ‘purity.’ In the process, poor and poverty are
reframed through similar logic of aesthetics as the riparian
environment. The politics of aesthetics as it is deployed
portray the poor and poverty through the frame of what
Ghertner (2016) calls “codes of civility and appearance.”
Meaning, if the urban poor, or sukumbasi, appear like they
can afford to follow these codes, they are ‘inauthentic’ and
they are assumed to own land elsewhere in the city. They
have to ‘look’ poor.

those given a landless designation. Finally, the relational
co-constitution of bourgeois environmentalism—that
which aspires to produce the authentic city—with the
politics of the poor ends up reducing the politics of the
poor into the realms of aesthetics. This dynamic creates a
rupture amongst the poor, not just on terms of ‘authenticity/inauthenticity’, but also in terms of aesthetics.

Ananya Roy calls this logic the “aestheticization of poverty,” which alludes to the reduction of relationship between
the viewers and viewed to one of “aesthetics rather than
politics” (2004). “Thus reduced, evictions and resettlement
become not tales of destruction of individual people’s lives
and livelihoods, but simply the erasure of an image of a
slum, emptied of the people who live within it,” argues
Bhan (2009: 140). But politics of aesthetic and authentic,
as deployed, become not just tales of erasure of livelihood
and lifestyle. There is more to it. Poor people are not merely passive recipients of the politics of aesthetic deployed
by the state or other powerful actors. Instead, they devise
ways to inhabit the state-produced discourse of ‘inauthenticity,’ and turn it on its head to find newer ways to make
demands. This acquiescence to allegations of ‘inauthenticity’ may first appear as inclusionary as it could potentially
encourage (some) collaboration with the state; in reality, is
exclusive. However, the strategy of gaining state legitimacy inevitably reproduces the discourse of ‘authentic’
and ‘inauthentic,’ without transcending the ideology and
politics that produce such a discourse in the first place. In
so doing, their acquiescence produces new class cleavages among sukumbasi while re-inscribing the older ones.
The problem with this strategy is that although this may
help to achieve participation in the planning process for
some sukumbasi households, it does so at the expense of a
collaborative mode of engagement among wider sukumbasi
communities. Adopting the state’s frames to distinguish
between ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ sukumbasi, the movement’s leadership produces class cleavages among sukumbasi—between those who were alleged to be ‘landed’ and
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Endnotes
1. Ramesh Prasad Bhusal, “PM inaugurates BAP,” The
Himalayan Times, December 25, 2009, accessed November
16, 2016, <http://thehimalayantimes.com/kathmandu/
pm-nepal-inaugurates-bap/>.

5. Based on interviews conducted with some of the earlier
sukumbasi settlers in the city, Buddha Nagar is one of the
oldest settlements in the city, its origin dating back to the
1970s.
6. No one, including sukumbasi or Lumanti, who work
with them, disagree that there are landowning sukumbasi
either in Kathmandu or elsewhere. However, the land
owned elsewhere is uninhabitable for several reasons.
For example, it is in a remote area without access to
services. Additionally, in the last five years, there has
been a notable increase in the number and size of loans
borrowed from cooperatives for purchasing land in the
city. Lajana Manandhar, who works closely with the
cooperatives, claims that sukumbasi purchasing land in
the city own the land but cannot afford to build a house.
The bigger question, reminds Manandhar, is how do we
address housing and shelter as poverty moves from the
countryside to the city—from the rural to the urban?
(Rademacher 2009).
7. Basobas is a central organization of the sukumbasi
population in Nepal. It has a federated network spread
across forty-four different districts. A rights-based
organization, Basobas advocates for landownership-based
shelter rights of sukumbasi in Nepal.
8. Hukumbasi is a term that is used derogatorily to denote
landowning sukumbasi; dalal is a derogatory term for a land
broker.
9. SDI is a network of urban poor communities, including
squatter communities, in over thirty-three cities in the
global South. SDI occasionally provides funding to Basobas
on a regular basis for covering logistics and organizational
expenses. But more importantly, they also provide
different template for Basobas that become the basis for
organizing around advocacy works.

2. Pragati Shahi, “Shouldering burden to revive lost
glory,” The Kathmandu Post, August 7, 2012, accessed
November 16, 2016, <http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.
com/news/2012-08-06/shouldering-burden-to-revive-lostglory.html>.

10. Mahesh Bahadur Basnet was the chairman of BAP
during the time of the fieldwork in 2012. His term ended in
2013.

3. This notion of ‘inauthentic sukumbasi’, or
‘inauthenticity’, that I use frequent in this chapter, and
that forms one of the central concepts of this chapter, is an
English translation of the Nepali term ‘nakkali sukumabsi’,
that state officials mostly use during interviews as well as
informal conversations.
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4. I call this a ‘homemade version’ because Kathmandu’s
march to modernity is not directly dictated by global
financial capitalism in the same way the aspirants of the
‘world class’ tag such as Delhi or Mumbai.
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